Russia said Aug. 26 that it will end or curtail peacekeeping
cooperation with NATO in several areas, but will continue to work with
the West in Afghanistan. This is a veiled threat, of course; Russia is
letting NATO know that its cooperation is not assured. There are a
number of ways in which Russia could hamstring the West’s operations in
Afghanistan, but none of these options is without risk for Moscow.
Russia also benefits from having the U.S. military commitment in
Afghanistan continue both because it consumes U.S. military capacity
and because it helps contain and focus Islamist extremism in the wider
region — and Russia also has its own internal problems with such
extremism.
Analysis
Russian envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said Aug. 26
that Russia will end or curtail peacekeeping cooperation with NATO in
several areas, but will continue to work with the West in Afghanistan,
which he called “a shared problem.” He noted, however, that Moscow
could impose further limits later if events should warrant it. His
comments follow an Aug. 21 statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov that Russia does not need NATO as much as NATO needs Russia.
Following the conflict in Georgia, the Russians are working hard to
make sure the West is aware of just how many cards they hold in the
former Soviet sphere. Moscow is doing its best to take full advantage
of the window of opportunity created by the effective absorption of the
U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is trying to ensure that
that window stays open as long as possible.
In this context, Rogozin’s and Lavrov’s comments are delivering a
threat to NATO, quite thinly veiled: Russia can compound the
already-complicated logistical nightmares facing Western military
operations in Afghanistan if its wishes are not respected — and is
reminding Washington that there are benefits to being agreeable with
Moscow. Although there are a number of reasons why Russia would rather
not make good on this threat (or might in practice prove unable to), it
is a warning that NATO cannot afford to dismiss.
Russia’s wishes are clear: Western acknowledgement of Russian primacy in the former Soviet region,
and, in particular, an end to NATO overtures to Ukraine, Georgia and
other former Soviet republics. There has been no indication, however,
that the United States and its allies are prepared to grant that. If
anything, U.S. and European rhetoric has run the opposite way,
condemning Moscow for its moves in Georgia and threatening reprisals
(which, however, have not yet materialized). Russia’s focus, then, is
on drawing Western countries’ attention to the pressure points where
Russia can hurt them most. One of the most important of these is
Afghanistan.
Russia could begin by refusing to allow the transit of supplies and
equipment through its territory to NATO forces in Afghanistan, just as
two agreements in recent years have begun to become established. Moscow
also could exert influence in the former Soviet republics of
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and attempt to pressure them to
shut down or complicate NATO supply routes, as well as attempt to
pressure Kyrgyzstan to shut down the U.S. air base at Manas.
The war in Afghanistan already presents a significant logistical
challenge for NATO and U.S.